Introduction
Over the longer term, higher productivity, together with Engel's law, has led to average annual price declines of many agricultural products of the order of 1-2%. In the present paper, we demonstrate that a similar process seems to have operated for marijuana, with one important difference. Marijuana prices have declined much more rapidly than those of most other agricultural products -by approximately 5 per cent per annum in real terms over the past decade. Research on the behaviour of marijuana prices is of interest because of the widespread use of the product. Surveys indicate that in some countries up to one third of the adult population have used marijuana and in Australia, one of world's biggest consumers, over 40 per cent of people favour its decriminalisation. Expenditure on marijuana by Australians has been estimated to be approximately twice that on wine. 1 Why have marijuana prices fallen so much? What is the nature of the marijuana market in Australia? To what extent has the decline in marijuana prices been responsible for the high level of consumption? In this paper we address these issues and argue that there are three defining characteristics of the behaviour of marijuana prices, which we refer to as 'three facts':
1. There seems to exist regional markets for marijuana, rather than one national market . Prices are substantially more expensive in the Sydney market, followed by Melbourne and Canberra, and then the rest of Australia.
The real price of marijuana has fallen by almost 40 per cent over the 1990s
in Australia . As indicated, this fall is much more than that of most agricultural products. One explanation for the substantial fall is the widespread adoption of hydroponic techniques of production, which has enhanced productivity and lowered costs. Another explanation is that because of changing community attitudes, laws have become softer and penalties reduced, thus lowering part of the 'expected full cost' of transacting marijuana. 3. Lower prices have stimulated marijuana consumption and reduced alcohol consumption . As marijuana and alcohol would appear to both satisfy a similar want of the consumer, they are probably substitutes in consumption. Under certain scenarios, the lower marijuana prices would have resulted in a substantial rise in marijuana consumption and a corresponding fall in alcohol consumption.
Section 2 of the present paper provides information regarding the data on marijuana prices. Section 3 deals with the identification of regional markets of marijuana. The substantial decline in prices is analysed in some depth in Section 4 and compared to the behaviour of the prices of other commodities. Section 5 provides an exploratory analysis of the extent to which lower prices have encouraged marijuana usage and discouraged the consumption of a substitute product, alcohol. Section 6 contains some concluding comments.
The prices
The data on Australian marijuana prices were generously supplied by Mark Hazell of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence. These prices were collected by law enforcement agencies in the various states and territories during undercover buys. In general, the data are quarterly and refer to the period 1990-1999, for each state and territory. The different types of marijuana identified separately are leaf, heads, hydroponics, skunk, hash resin and hash oil. However, we focus on only the prices of 'leaf ' and 'heads', as these products are the most popular. The data are described by Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (1996) , who discuss some difficulties with them regarding different recording practices used by the various agencies and missing observations. While it is unlikely that these data constitute a random sample, a common problem when studying the prices of almost any illicit good, it is not clear that they would be biased either upwards or downwards. In any event, they are the only data available.
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The prices are usually recorded in the form of ranges and the basic data are listed in Clements and Daryal (2001) . The data are 'consolidated' by: (i) using the mid-point of each price range, (ii) converting all gram prices to ounces by multiplying by 28, and (iii) annualising the data by averaging the quarterly or semiannual observations. Annualising has the effect of reducing the considerable noise in the quarterly/semiannual data. Plotting the data revealed several outliers, which probably reflect some of the mentioned recording problems. Observations are treated as outliers if they are either less than one-half of the mean for the corresponding state, or greater than twice the mean. This rule led to five outlying observations, which are omitted and replaced with the relevant means, based on the remaining observations. The data, after consolidation and editing, for each state and territory are given in tables 1 and 2 for leaf and heads, respectively, purchased in the form of either grams or ounces. Columns 2-5 of table 3 give the corresponding Australian prices (defined as population-weighted means of the state prices), while column 6 gives a weighted mean of the four prices defined as exp , where p it is the price of product i in year t and w i is the market share of product i , guestimated to be 0.06 for leaf/gram, 0.24 for leaf/ounce, 0.14 for head/gram and 0.56 for head/ounce. This is Stone's (1953) weighted geometric mean, with weights reflecting the relative importance of the products in consumption (see Clements 2002 , for full details). As can be seen from column 6 of table 3, the index of marijuana prices exhibits a substantial decline over the 1990s, starting off at # A577 per ounce in 1990 2 This section draws on Clements and Daryal (2001 Purchased in the form of a gram  1990  770  735  700  802  700  700  910  630  747  1991  1050  770  700  770  700  700  1050  642  852  1992  1060  700  630  700  560  700  700  630  798  1993  583  711  683  653  630  665  613  595  645  1994  998  698  648  700  630  665  443  753  779  1995  1085  700  560  700  630  735  560  753  797  1996  1400  793  665  753  630  788  508  700  949  1997  1400  490  560  653  630  718  525  613  843  1998  1097  735  630  467  653  683  467  723  798  1999  1155  636  700  556  630  700  642  700  816  Mean  1060  697  648  675  639  705  642  674  802   Purchased in the form of an ounce  1990  438  513  225  210  388  275  313  413  390  1991  475  450  215  170  400  275  350  325  381  1992  362  363  188  340  225  300  188  350  313  1993  383  409  168  200  388  281  175  250  326  1994  419  394  181  288  325  244  170  400  341  1995  319  400  400  308  347  294  163  256  350  1996  325  383  350  283  350  263  200  408  339  1997  288  285  431  263  350  288  375  386  320  1998  333  363  375  250  350  300  375  450  344  1999  275  313  444  250  350  300  262  450  322  Mean  362  387  298  256  347  282  257  369  343   Year  NSW  VIC  QLD  WA  SA  NT  TAS  ACT  Weighted mean   Purchased in the form of a gram  1990  1120  1050  1400  1120  1400  700  910  840  1159  1991  1120  1120  1400  962  1400  700  1120  840  1168  1992  1400  1120  910  770  700  700  1225  770  1103  1993  863  665  858  840  1173  700  927  747  834  1994  1155  770  1068  840  1120  770  735  980  992  1995  1190  793  843  749  1138  793  1155  1033  974  1996  1171  840  771  704  910  840  963  1400  944  1997  1400  858  630  700  840  863  700  793  977  1998  1120  840  723  630  840  823  723  840  889  1999  1224  630  589  560  840  840  630  1006  841  Mean  1176  869  919  788  1036  773  909  925  988   Purchased in the form of an ounce  1990  600  650  413  600  400  325  525  463  557  1991  600  550  425  502  200  325  450  375  504  1992  375  450  388  390  363  450  425  500  401  1993  500  348  363  431  450  363  344  383  419  1994  550  367  328  400  425  325  363  550  432  1995  538  400  320  354  438  358  350  438  430  1996  550  400  398  325  406  283  388  525  444  1997  550  400  538  300  400  358  383  442  466  1998  488  388  550  275  340  325  367  450  437  1999  513  400  300  250  400  300  325  479  403  Mean  526  435  402  383  382  341  392  461  449 and ending up 9 years later some 23 per cent lower at # A442. More will be said about this decline in Section 4.
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A further aspect of the prices in table 3 is the substantial quantity discounts available when buying in bulk. In 1999, for example, the price of heads purchased in the form of grams is # A841 per ounce, while the same quantity purchased in the form of an ounce is # A403 per ounce, a discount of approximately 52 per cent. Such quantity discounts have been observed in other illicit drug markets (Brown and Silverman 1974; Caulkins and Padman 1993) . One explanation for these discounts involves the pricing of risk (see, e.g., Brown and Silverman 1974) . It is argued that when drugs are sold in smaller lots, the risk of being caught is not proportionally less than when dealing with larger lots. This leads to an expected penalty that rises with lot size, but less than proportionately, and quantity discounts. Another explanation is that the discounts are simply a reflection of value added as drugs flow through the distribution chain, which operates in exactly the same way as do those for licit goods (Brown and Silverman 1974) . Therefore, for example, as groceries move from the wholesale to retail levels, lot sizes typically fall and unit costs rise, reflecting the costs of the retail services provided. 
Fact 1: marijuana is expensive in New South Wales
Is the market for marijuana a nationally organised activity, or is it merely a 'cottage industry' that just satisfies local demand? To put it another way, is marijuana a (nationally) traded good, or is it non-traded? If there were a national market for marijuana, then after appropriate allowance for transport costs etc., marijuana prices should be more or less equalised across states and territories. This section investigates these issues. South Australia decriminalised marijuana in 1987 and recent media reports have focused on Adelaide as the centre of the marijuana industry. Radio National (1999) recently noted that:
'Cannabis is by far and away the illicit drug of choice for Australians. There is a multi-billion dollar industry to supply it, and increasingly, the centre of action is the city of churches.'
That program quoted a person called 'David' as saying:
'Say 5, 10 years ago, everyone spoke of the country towns of New South Wales and the north coast, now you never hear of it; those towns have died in this regard I'd say, because they're lost out to the indoor variety, the hydro, and everyone was just saying South Australia, Adelaide, Adelaide, Adelaide, and that's where it all seems to be coming from.'
In a similar vein, the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (1999, p. 18) commented on marijuana being exported from South Australia to other states as follows:
'New South Wales Police reported that cannabis has been found secreted in the body parts of motor vehicles from South Australia … It is reported that cannabis originating in South Australia is transported to neighbouring jurisdictions. South Australia Police reported that large amounts of cannabis are transported from South Australia by air, truck, hire vehicles, buses and private motor vehicles.
Queensland Police reported that South Australian cannabis is sold on the Gold Coast. New South Wales Police reported South Australian vehicles returning to that state have been found carrying large amounts of cash or amphetamines, or both. It also considers that the decrease in the amount of locally grown cannabis is the result of an increase in the quantity of South Australian cannabis in New South Wales.
The Australian Federal Police in Canberra reported that the majority of cannabis transported to the Australian Capital Territory is from the Murray Bridge area of South Australia …'
As the above comments point to Adelaide being a major exporter of marijuana to other parts of Australia, this would seem to imply that the market is a national, not local, one. In turn, this would mean that marijuana prices would tend to be equalised across Australia if transport and differences in other distribution costs were relatively minor. The validity of this hypothesis can be examined with our regional-level data, and Panel I of table 4 gives the results of regressing the prices on dummy variables for each state and territory. In this panel, the dependent variable is log p rt , where p rt is the price of the relevant type of marijuana in region r ( r = 1, … , 8) and year t ( t = 1990, … , 1999) . As the data are pooled over time and regions, the total number of observations for each equation is 8 × 10 = 80. Given the use of the logarithm of the price and as NSW is used as the base, when multiplied by 100, the coefficient of a given dummy variable is interpreted as the approximate percentage difference between the price in the corresponding region and that in NSW.
In Panel I of table 4 there are seven dummy variable coefficients for each of the four products. Only two of these 28 coefficients are positive, leaf/ ounce in Victoria and ACT, but these are both insignificantly different from zero. The vast majority of the other coefficients are significantly negative, which says that marijuana prices are significantly lower in all regions relative to NSW. While the R 2 values for these equations are low, this is not necessarily a problem given that the purpose is to test for regional price differences rather than to explain how prices are determined. As the market share of head ounce is the largest (see the previous section), let us concentrate on the results for this product given in row 4 of To what extent do the regional differences in marijuana prices reflect the cost of living in the location where it is sold? Panels II and III of table 4 explore this issue by using per capita incomes and housing prices as proxies for regional living costs. 4 In Panel II, we regress the logarithm of income on seven regional dummies. All the coefficients are negative, except those for the ACT. As can be seen from the last column of Panel II, the dispersion of income regionally is considerably less than that of marijuana prices, approximately one half, which could reflect the operation of the fiscal equalisation feature of the federal system. Panel III repeats the analysis with housing prices replacing incomes, and the results in the last column show that the regional dispersion of housing prices is of the same order of magnitude of that of marijuana prices.
The comparison of prices for marijuana and housing is facilitated in figure 1 , which plots the two sets of prices relative to NSW/Sydney by using the regional dummy-variable coefficients for head ounce (given in row 4 of table 4) and those for houses (row 7 of table 4). As the housing prices refer to capital cities in each region, while the marijuana prices refer to regions as a whole, for ease of exposition in what follows we shall refer to just capital cities rather than the region (for marijuana prices) and the corresponding capital city (for housing prices) simultaneously. The broken ray from the origin has a slope of 45° and as the scales of both axes are inverted, the vertical distance between this line and any point measures the difference in the housing-marijuana relative price between the city in question and that in Sydney. This relative price is thus higher for Darwin, and lower for the rest. An equivalent way of interpreting the figure is to note that as the two price differences, relative to Sydney, are equal along the 45° line, all points on the line correspond to the elasticity of marijuana prices with respect to housing prices being equal to unity; and for the points above (below) the line the elasticity is greater than (less than) unity. Accordingly, in all cities other than Darwin this elasticity is less than unity. The solid line in figure 1 is the least-squares regression line, constrained to pass through the origin.
5 As can be seen, the slope of this line is positive, but substantially less than unity. The estimated elasticity is 0.59 and has a standard error of 0.09, so that the elasticity is significantly different from both unity and zero. As the observation for Darwin lies substantially above the regression line, we can say that marijuana prices in that city are cheap given its housing prices, or that housing is expensive in view of the cost of marijuana. Among the seven non-Sydney cities, given its housing prices, marijuana would seem to be most overpriced, or housing most underpriced, in Hobart. 6 The final interesting feature of the figure is that it can be used to naturally divide up Australia into three super regions/cities: (i) NSW/Sydney -expensive marijuana and housing, (ii) Victoria/Melbourne and ACT/Canberra -moderately priced marijuana and housing, and (iii) the remaining -cheap marijuana and housing. 5 As prices are all expressed in terms of logarithmic ratios to Sydney, any fixed effects drop out. 6 The slope of a ray from the origin to any of the seven cities in figure 1 is the elasticity of marijuana prices with respect to housing prices for the city in question. Visually, it can be seen that this elasticity is a bit lower for Canberra than Hobart. But as this elasticity is the percentage change in marijuana prices for a unit percentage change in housing prices, it should not be confused with using the regression line to identify anomalies in the pricing of marijuana. The vertical distance between any observation and the regression line represents the extent of mispricing. The above discussion shows that to the extent that housing costs are a good proxy for living costs, marijuana prices are at least partially related to costs in general. As a substantial part of the overall price of marijuana is likely to reflect local distribution activities, which differ significantly across different regions, this could explain the finding that the market is not a national one, but a series of regional markets that are not too closely linked. Understanding the pricing of marijuana is enhanced if we split the product into: (i) a (nationally) traded component comprising mainly the 'raw' product, whose price is likely to be approximately equalised in different regions, and (ii) a non-traded component associated with packaging and local distribution, the price of which is less likely to be equalised. As such services are likely to be labour intensive, their prices will mainly reflect local wages which, in turn, would partly reflect local living costs. The results of this section point to the importance of the non-traded component of marijuana prices.
Fact 2: marijuana has become substantially cheaper
This section documents the fall in marijuana prices and canvases some possible explanations for the fall. Table 5 shows that over the 1990s marijuana prices have fallen by approximately 23 per cent in nominal terms (column 2), and 35 per cent relative to the CPI (column 5). The last entries in columns MPI, marijuana price index; CPI, consumer price index; API, alcohol price index. The MPI is from column 6 of table 3 with 1990 = 100; the CPI is from the DX database, rebased such that 1990 = 100; and the API is a levels version of a Divisia index of the prices of beer, wine and spirits, from Clements and Daryal (2003) .
10 and 11 of this table reveal that on average over the decade, marijuana prices in terms of consumer prices fell by 4.9 per cent p.a and by 5.7 per cent per annum in terms of alcohol prices. No matter if the CPI or alcohol prices are used as the deflator, the result is the same: The relative price of marijuana has fallen substantially.
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How do marijuana prices compare with those of other commodities? In an influential article, Grilli and Yang (1988) analyse the prices of 24 commodities that are traded internationally. We convert these to relative prices (using the USA CPI) and then compute the average annual log-changes over the period . Figure 2 gives the price changes for the 24 commodities plus marijuana. The striking feature of this graph is that marijuana prices have fallen the most by far. The only commodity to come close is rubber, but even then its average price fall is one percentage point less than that for marijuana (−3.9 vs. − 4.9% p.a) There is a substantial drop off in the price declines after rubber: palm oil (−2.3 per cent), rice (−2.2 per cent), cotton (−2.0 per cent), and so on. Surprisingly, the price of tobacco, which might be considered to be related to marijuana in both consumption and production, increased by 0.9 per cent per annum The declines in most of the commodity prices reflect the impact of productivity enhancement 7 The first part of this section is based on Clements and Daryal (2001) , except that here we use population-weighted marijuana prices. coupled with low income elasticities of demand. Additionally, in earlier parts of the twentieth century, the area devoted to agriculture was still rising in some countries, and this would have contributed to the downward pressure on commodity prices.
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Why did marijuana prices fall by so much? One reason is that the growing of marijuana has been subject to productivity enhancement by the adoption of hydroponic techniques, 9 which lead to a higher-quality product containing higher Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) levels.
10 For example, hydroponically grown marijuana from northern Tasmania has been analysed as containing 16 per cent of THC, while that grown outdoors in the south of the state contained 12.8% (Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, ABCI 1996). The ease of concealment and near ideal growing conditions, which produce good-quality plants, are the main reasons for the shift to hydroponic systems. According to the ABCI (1996), 'Hydroponic systems are being used to grow cannabis on a relatively large scale. Unlike external plantations, hydroponic cultivation can be used in any region and is not regulated by growing seasons. Both residential and industrial areas are used to establish these indoor sites. Cellars and concealed rooms in existing residential and commercial properties are also used … The use of shipping containers to grow cannabis with hydroponic equipment has been seen in many cases. The containers are sometimes buried on rural properties to reduce chances of detection. ' (pp. 30-31) Other anecdotal evidence also points to the rise of hydroponic activity over this period. For example, according to the Yellow Pages telephone directory, in 1999 Victoria had 149 hydroponics suppliers, NSW 115, SA 69, Queensland 59 and WA 58. One suspects that many of these operations supply marijuana growers. For a further discussion of this anecdotal evidence, see Clements (2002) .
A second possible reason for the decline in marijuana prices is that, because of changing community attitudes, laws have become softer and penalties reduced. Information on the enforcement of marijuana laws distinguishes between (i) infringement notices issued for minor offences and (ii) arrests. Table 6 presents the available data on infringement notices for the three states/territories that use them, SA, NT and ACT. As can be seen, per capita infringement notices have declined substantially in SA since 1996, increased in NT, first increased and then declined in ACT, and declined noticeably for Australia as a whole, where they have fallen by almost 50 per cent. This information points in the direction of a lower policing effort. Data on arrests and prosecution for marijuana offences are given in table 7. Panel I shows that the arrest rate for NSW was more or less stable over the 6-year period, while that for Victoria fell substantially as a result of a 'redirection of police resources away from minor cannabis offences' (ABCI 1998). For Queensland, the arrest rate rose by more than 50 per cent in 1997, and then fell back to a more or less stable value, but in WA the rate fell markedly in 1999 with the introduction of a trial of cautioning and mandatory education to 'reduce the resources previously used to pursue prosecutions for simple cannabis offences' (ABCI 2000). For Australia, the arrest rate fell from 342 in 1996 to 232 in 2001 (per 100 000 population), a decline of 32 per cent. Data on successful prosecution of marijuana cases for three states are given in Panel II of table 7 (data for the other states/territories are not available). For both NSW and SA, the prosecution rate has fallen substantially. Not only has the prosecution rate fallen, lighter sentences have become much more common. Interestingly, in the early 1990s the prosecution rate was much higher in SA than in NSW, but by the end of the decade the rate was approximately the same in the two states. In WA, the prosecution rate is fairly stable, but the period is much shorter. No clear pattern emerges from the information on the percentage of arrests that result in a successful prosecution, as shown in Panel III of table 7. (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
To understand further the evolution of enforcement of marijuana laws, it is useful to consider a simple model. Let be the penalty of type i (i = 1, 2, for an infringement notice and an arrest, respectively) in region r (r = 1, … , 8) and year t (t = 1996, … , 2001 --215  ----1997  36  ---88  ----1998  35  --35  25  ----1999  37  --71  22  ----2000  35  --69  28  ----2001  35  --61  51  ----Mean  36  --59  72  ---- Arrests exclude the issuing of Cannabis Expiation Notices, Simple Cannabis Offence Notices and Infringement Notices, which are used in SA, NT and ACT. For details of these, see table 6. The arrests data for 1996 for SA seem to be problematic and need to be treated with caution. According to Australian Illicit Drug Report 2000-01, arrests were 2076, which when divided by the population of SA of 1474 253 yields 141 per 100 000, as reported above. However, according to the 2001-02 edition of the above mentioned publication, arrests for the same state in the same year were 18 477, or 1253 per 100 000. We used the 141 figure as it appeared to be more consistent with data for adjacent years; however, the use of this figure leads to a prosecutions/arrests rate of 215%, as reported in Panel III of this 
where if r = s, 0 otherwise; if i = an infringement, 0 otherwise; and δ, α s , β and λ are parameters. The value of the regional parameter α s indicates the severity of penalties in region s relative to NSW (the base case); the parameter β tells us about the infringement rate in comparison to that of arrests; and λ is the residual exponential trend in all types of enforcement in all regions. Table 8 gives the estimates of model (1), obtained with data given in tables 6 and 7. As compared to NSW, Victoria, NT and ACT are all lowpenalty regions, while the other four have higher penalties on average. In Section 3 we ranked regions in terms of the cost of marijuana, which can be compared with the severity of penalties as follows:
Cost (cheapest to most expensive): NT, WA, SA, TAS, QLD, VIC, ACT, NSW Penalties (weakest to most severe): ACT, NT, VIC, NSW, TAS, SA, QLD, WA As the relationship between the two rankings is obviously weak, with major differences for most states, regional disparities in penalties do not seem to be systematically associated with regional price differences. Controlling for regional and time effects, the estimated coefficient of the infringement dummy indicates that these are significantly higher than arrests. The estimated trend term shows that all penalties are falling on average by approximately 8 per cent per annum, a fall that is significantly different from zero. Consider those three regions that have infringement notices. To what extent have infringement notices partially displaced arrests? In other words, are the two forms of penalties substitutes for one another? For example, in the NT the infringements rate rose from 179 in 1999 to 401 in 2000, while over the same period the arrest rate fell from 183 to 62. This would seem to support the idea that the two types of penalties are substitutes. However, to proceed more systematically, we need to control for all the effects of factors determining penalties in model (1) by using the residuals, and examine the comovement of infringements and arrests in the three regions over the 6 years. Figure 3 is a scatter plot of these residuals and as can be clearly seen, there is a significant negative relationship between arrests and infringements. This means that more infringement notices are associated with fewer arrests, other factors remaining unchanged. This, of course, must have been one of the key objectives associated with the introduction of the infringement regime. Taken as a whole, the above analysis seems to support the idea that participants in the marijuana industry have faced a declining probability of being arrested and/or successfully prosecuted; and even if they are arrested and successfully prosecuted, the expected penalty is now lower. In other words, both the effort devoted to the enforcement of existing laws and penalties seem to have decreased. Accordingly, the expected value of this component of the 'full cost' of using marijuana has fallen. During the period considered, NSW, Victoria, WA and Tasmania all introduced marijuana cautioning programs (ABCI 2000) and SA, NT and ACT all issued marijuana offence notices. This seems to indicate changing community attitudes to marijuana associated with the reduced 'policing effort'. It is plausible that this has also led to lower marijuana prices. As the riskiness of buying and selling marijuana has fallen, so might have any risk premium built into prices. This explanation of lower prices has, however, been challenged by Basov et al. (2001) who analyse illicit drug prices in the USA. They show that while drug prohibition enforcement costs have risen substantially over the past 25 years, the relative prices of drugs have nonetheless declined. Basov et al. (2001) suggest four possible reasons for the decrease in prices: (i) production costs of drugs have declined, (ii) tax and regulatory cost increases have raised the prices of legal goods, but not illicit goods such as drugs, (iii) the market power of the illicit drug industry has fallen, and (iv) technologies to evade enforcement have improved. Although hard evidence is necessarily difficult to obtain, Basov et al. (2001) argue against explanations (i) and (ii), and favour (iii) and (iv) as realistic possibilities. 11 11 Miron (1999) studies the impact of prohibition on alcohol consumption in the USA during 1920-1933. Using the death rate from liver cirrhosis as a proxy for alcohol consumption, he finds that prohibition 'exerted a modest and possibly even positive effect on consumption.' This could be because prices fell for reasons given above. But there are other possibilities including a highly inelastic demand for alcohol and/or prohibition giving alcohol the status of a 'forbidden fruit', which some consumers might find attractive (Miron 1999) . To shed further light on the impact of prohibition on prices, Miron (2003) also compares the markup from farmgate to retail of cocaine and heroin with that of several legal products. He finds that while the markup for cocaine is high, it is of the same order of magnitude of that of chocolate, coffee, tea and barley/beer. While there are other factors determining markups, this evidence is suggestive that illegality per se may not raise drug prices as much as some people might think. On the basis of this and other evidence, Miron (2003, p. 529) concludes that 'the black market price of cocaine is 2-4 times the price that would obtain in a legal market, and of heroin 6 -19 times. In contrast, prior research has suggested that cocaine sells at 10-40 times its legal price and heroin at hundreds of times its legal price'. Consistent with this line of thinking is research that shows that increased enforcement of drug laws does not seem to result in higher prices (DiNardo 1993; Weatherburn and Lind 1997; Yuan and Caulkins 1998). We can summarise this section as follows. First, the relative price of marijuana has fallen substantially, by more than that of many other commodities. Second, two possible explanations for this decline are (i) productivity improvement in the production of marijuana associated with the adoption of hydroponic techniques; and (ii) the lower expected penalties for buying and selling marijuana. On the basis of the evidence currently available, both explanations seem to be equally plausible.
Fact 3: lower prices have boosted marijuana consumption and reduced alcohol consumption
The section contains some explorations of the likely impact of lower marijuana prices on usage, as well as their role in determining the consumption of a product that shares important common characteristics, alcohol. It should be acknowledged that our price and quantity data for marijuana are imperfect and are subject to more than the usual uncertainties. Moreover, as we have data for only a decade, we are severely constrained in carrying out an econometric analysis of the price responsiveness of consumption. Although Clements and Daryal (2003) attempted such an analysis, in this section we explore the alternative approach of drawing on the previous published literature and putting sufficient structure on the problem to be able to derive numerical values of the price elasticities of demand. This approach is used extensively in the literature on computable general equilibrium and equilibrium displacement modelling. We assume that alcohol and marijuana consumption as a group is weakly separable from all other goods in the consumer's utility function. While this rules out any specific substitutability/complementarity relationships between members of the group on the one hand, and products outside the group on the other, it is a fairly mild assumption. This assumption means that we can proceed conditionally and analyse consumption within the group independently of the prices of other goods (see, e.g., Clements 1987) . Next, we make the simplifying assumption that tastes with respect to alcohol and marijuana can be characterised by a utility function of the preference independent form. This means that if there are n goods in the group, the utility function is the sum of n subutility functions, one for each good,
, where q i is the quantity consumed of good i. Preference independence (PI) means that the marginal utility of each good is independent of the consumption of all others. The implications of PI are that all income elasticities are positive, so that inferior goods are ruled out, and all pairs of goods are Slutsky substitutes. The hypothesis of PI has been recently tested with alcohol data for seven countries by Clements et al. (1997) and, using a variety of tests, they find that the hypothesis cannot be
12 There have been nine prior studies of the relationship between alcohol and marijuana consumption, eight for the USA and one for Australia (Cameron and Williams 2001) . Four of the nine studies find substitutability between alcohol and marijuana (DiNardo and Lemieux 1992; Model 1993; Chaloupka and Laixuthai 1997; Cameron and Williams 2001) , two find complementarity (Pacula 1997 (Pacula , 1998 , one finds the relationship to be mostly complementarity (Saffer and Chaloupka 1998) , while two are inconclusive (Thies and Register 1993; Saffer and Chaloupka 1995) . Therefore, while these studies do not give a completely unambiguous picture, the weight of the evidence seems to point to alcohol and marijuana being substitutes, which is not inconsistent with the PI assumption.
The further implications of PI are as follows. Let p i be the price of good i (i = 1, ... , n), q i be the corresponding quantity demanded, be total expenditure ('income' for short), and w i = p i q i /M be the budget share of good i. Furthermore, let η ij = ∂ (log q i )/∂ (log p j ) be the compensated elasticity of demand for good i with respect to the price of good j, φ be the price elasticity of demand for the group of goods as a whole, and η i be the income elasticity of demand for good i. We then have the fundamental relationship linking the price and income elasticities under PI,
where δ ij is the Kronecker delta (δ ij = 1 if i = j, 0 otherwise). For the derivation of equation (2) and more details see, for example, Clements et al. (1995) . We shall obtain numerical values of the price elasticities by using equation (2) in conjunction with values of φ and η i that have appeared in the published literature. Table 9 presents for several countries estimates of the income elasticities for three alcoholic beverages, beer, wine and spirits, as well as the price elasticity of alcohol as a whole. These elasticities are derived from estimates of the Rotterdam model under preference independence. We use them as a guide to the values of income elasticities of the members of the broader group alcohol and marijuana, as set out in table 10. As can be seen from column 2 of table 10, beer is taken to have an income elasticity of 0.5 (so that it is a necessity), wine 1.0 (a borderline case) and spirits 2.0 (a strong luxury). We shall come back to the elasticity for marijuana. Column 3 gives the four budget shares, which are based on the means given in the last row of table 11. We derive the income elasticity of marijuana from the constraint 12 Earlier studies tended to reject PI (see Barten 1977 , for a survey), but it is now understood that the source of many of these rejections was the use of asymptotic tests, which were biased against the null (Selvanathan 1987 (Selvanathan , 1993 .
. This yields η 4 = 1.2, as indicated by the last entry of column 2 of table 10, which implies that marijuana is a mild luxury.
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The only remaining parameter on the right-hand side of equation (2) to discuss is φ, the own-price elasticity of demand for the group (alcohol and marijuana) as a whole. It can be seen from equation (2) that φ acts as a 'scaling' parameter. Prior estimates of φ for alcohol are given in column 6 of table 10, and these average − 0.7. As marijuana is likely to be a substitute 13 It is appropriate to say a few words about the consumption data in table 11. The quantity consumed of marijuana is estimated on the basis of the National Drug Strategy Household Survey (1999), together with some plausible assumptions that link intensity of use to frequency of use; see Clements and Daryal (2003) for details. Although all care was taken in preparing these estimates, and they are not inconsistent with independent estimates, it must be acknowledged that they are likely to be subject to a substantial margin of error. Panel I of table 11 reveals that over the 1990s, per capita beer consumption fell from 140 to 117 L, wine increased from 22.9 to 24.6, spirits grew from 3.87 to 4.32, and marijuana consumption increased from 0.765 to 0.788 ounces per capita. In what follows, we analyse the extent to which the fall in marijuana prices caused alcohol consumption to grow at a slower rate than would otherwise be the case. The final thing to note about table 11 is that from Panel IV, on average the budget shares are roughly 0.40, 0.15, 0.15 and 0.30 for beer, wine, spirits and marijuana, respectively. Accordingly, expenditure on marijuana is approximately equal to the sum of that on wine and spirits, or to put it another way, approximately twice wine expenditure. Table 9 Demand elasticities for alcoholic beverages Per capita refers to those 14 years and over. The marijuana prices are from column 6 of table 3. All other data are from Clements and Daryal (2003) .
for alcohol, the effect of expanding the group of goods in question from alcoholic beverages to alcohol plus marijuana would be for the price elasticity to fall in absolute value. This means that we should use for the alcohol and marijuana group a | φ |-value of less than 0.7. Clements and Daryal (2003) estimate φ for Australia for alcohol or marijuana to be − 0.4; while going in the right direction, this estimate is subject to some qualifications because of the uncertainties associated with the limited data available. It would, therefore, seem sensible to use several values of φ to reflect the genuine uncertainties surrounding the values of this parameter. This approach is pursued in table 12, where we apply equation (2) with four values of φ. As can be seen, the own-price elasticity of marijuana for example declines (in absolute value) from − 0.8 (when φ = −1.0), to −0.5 (φ = − 0.6), to − 0.2 (φ = − 0.3), to − 0.1 (φ = − 0.1).
We now use the cross-price elasticities to simulate consumption under the counter-factual assumption that marijuana prices did not fall as much as they did. As alcohol and marijuana are substitutes, this will have the effect of stimulating consumption of the three beverages and causing marijuana usage to grow by less. Let q it be the per capita consumption of good The parameter φ is the own-price elasticity of demand for alcohol and marijuana as a group. The (i, j ) th element in a given panel is η ij , the compensated elasticity of demand for good i with respect to the price of good j.
i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4; for beer, wine, spirits and marijuana) in year t (t = 1, … , T ) and let Dq i = log q iT − log q i,1 be the corresponding log-change from the first year in the period (1990) to the last (1998). Then, if η ij = ∂(log q i )/∂ (log p j ) is the elasticity of consumption of good i with respect to the price of good j, as an approximation it follows that Dq i = η ij × Dp j , where Dp j is the logchange in the j th price over the 9 years. In the simulation, let all determinants of consumption be unchanged except the price of marijuana, which is specified to take the value D4 4 . The associated simulated value of the change in consumption of good i is then η i 4 D4 4 . This change in consumption holds everything else constant. The impact on consumption of the observed changes in all factors, including the price of marijuana, is incorporated in the observed log-change, Dq i . We shall allow these factors to vary as in fact they did, but we need to take out the impact of the observed changes in marijuana prices. Let the observed log-change in marijuana prices over the whole period be α. If marijuana prices were constant and the other determinants took their observed values, then the change in the consumption of good i would be Dq i − η i 4 α. Adding back the effect as a result of the simulated price change D4 4 , the simulated change in consumption of good i over the whole period is
As Dq i = log q iT − log q i,1 and Dq i = log q iT − log q i,1 , where q iT is simulated consumption of good i in year T, it follows that equation (3) simplifies to
In words, simulated consumption in the last year, relative to actual in that year, is equal to the relevant price elasticity applied to the counterfactual change in the price of marijuana, adjusted for the observed change. To implement equation (4), we go back to table 11, which gives in Panels I and II the observed quantities and prices in terms of levels. Columns 2-5 of table 13 convert these data to annual log-changes. Column 7 contains the Divisia volume and price indexes for alcohol and marijuana as a group, defined as (5) where w it = 1/2(w it + w i , t−1 ) is the arithmetic average of the i th budget share in years t, t − 1; and Dq it = log q it − log q i , t−1 and Dp it = log p it − log p i , t−1 are log ( ). 14 Denoting the alcohol group by the subscript A, the within-alcohol version of equation (5) is (6) It follows from equations (5) and (6) that the two sets of indexes are related according to DQ t = (1 − w 4t )DQ At + w 4t Dq 4t , DP t = (1 − w 4t )DP At + w 4t Dp 4t .
14 Note that the log-change over the whole period is just the sum of the component annual log-changes. The see this, consider T positive numbers x 1 , … , x T . Then , as adjacent values in the sum cancel. The alcohol indexes are presented in column 6 of table 13. According to the price index for alcohol (Panel II, column 6), on average, the price of this group grew faster than that of alcohol plus marijuana (column 7) as marijuana prices rise much slower (in fact, they fall on average) than those of the three alcoholic beverages. Exactly the opposite situation occurs with the volume indexes of the two groups, given in Panel I.
We are now in a position to evaluate equation (4) for i = beer, wine, spirits and marijuana. From the last entry in column 5 of table 13, the log-change in the price of marijuana over the whole period 1990-1998, α, is −19.87 × 10 −2
. Regarding the counter-factual trajectory of marijuana prices, we first assume that they were constant over the period, so that D4 4 = 0. Using these values, together with the elasticities involving marijuana prices, η i4 , given in the last column of table 12, we obtain the counter-factual quantity changes.
Panel I of table 14 contains the results. According to the first row of this panel, which is based on group price elasticity φ taking a value of −1.0, if marijuana prices had been constant over the whole period, rather than falling by approximately 20 per cent, beer consumption in 1998 is simulated to be approximately 3.6 per cent higher than actual, wine 7.2 per cent higher, spirits 14.3 per cent higher, and marijuana 15.3 per cent lower. The differences among the three alcoholic beverages reflect the values of their elasticities with respect to the price of marijuana. Spirits consumption increases the most as it has the largest cross-price elasticities with η 34 = 0.72 (from the The elements in this table are 100 times the logarithmic ratios of simulated consumption (q iT ) to actual consumption (q iT ) in year T = 1998. They are therefore interpreted as approximately equal to the percentage differences between simulated and actual in that year, with the differences attributable to the counter-factual values of marijuana prices whereby these prices are: (i) held constant over the period 1990 -1998 , and (ii) grow at the same rate as alcohol prices over this period (Panel II).
last column of Panel I of table 12), then comes wine (η 24 = 0.36), followed by beer (η 14 = 0.18). The second, third and fourth rows of Panel I of table 14 contain the same results for different values of φ. As there are uncertainties about the precise value of this elasticity, as discussed, we adopt the conservative approach of focusing on a | φ |-value which is likely to be on the low side, namely 0.3. According to this value, beer consumption is higher by 1.0 per cent when marijuana prices are held constant, wine is 2.2 per cent higher, spirits 4.4 per cent higher, and marijuana 4.6 per cent lower.
In the second simulation, it is assumed that marijuana prices grow at the same rate over 1990-1998 as did alcohol prices. From the last entry in column 6 of table 13, the log-change in the index of alcohol prices over this period was 25.35 × 10 −2 , so that on the right-hand side of equation (4), we set D4 4 = 25.35 × 10 −2 and α = −19.87 × 10 −2 , as before. The results are given in Panel II of table 14. Focusing again on the case where φ = − 0.3, it can be seen that when the alcohol: marijuana relative price is held constant, beer consumption is 2.4 per cent higher than actual in 1998, wine 4.9 per cent higher, spirits 9.8 per cent higher, and marijuana consumption is 10.4 per cent lower. While these differences are not huge, they are still far from trivial and demonstrate clearly the interrelationships between alcohol and marijuana prices. 
Concluding comments
The present paper has identified a substantial decline in the relative price of marijuana over the 1990s, discussed the possible causes and analysed some of the implications. We also investigated some regional dimensions of the market for marijuana. Rather than reiterating the findings, we comment briefly on some of their broader implications:
1. By their very nature, illicit goods and services are excluded from official statistics. If the prices of other illicit activities have fallen as much as that of marijuana, the CPI will be overstated, and real incomes and productivity measures will be understated. 2. Further studies of illicit sectors of the economy could be rewarding in understanding how incentives operate to encourage the adoption of new technology. This may provide some guidance regarding appropriate policies to boost productivity in legal activities and in the identification of impediments to the introduction of technological improvements.
3. Our analysis indicates that the lower price of marijuana is likely to have reduced consumption of a substitute product, alcohol. In some scenarios this reduction is substantial. Producers of beer, wine and spirits might therefore be tempted to argue that on the basis of considerations of competitive neutrality, marijuana production should be legalised and subject to the same hefty taxes as they are. 4. Suppose marijuana were legalised and its production taxed. Who would bear most of the burden of this tax -growers or consumers? In view of the apparent ease with which marijuana can now be grown with hydroponic techniques and because demand is almost surely price inelastic, it would be consumers who would bear the bulk of the incidence of the tax, not growers. In such a case, maybe the incentives for growers to continue to innovate would remain more or less unchanged in a legalised regime.
